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Local Computation Mechanism Design
Avinatan Hassidim ∗ Yishay Mansour † Shai Vardi ‡
Abstract
We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design - designing game theoretic
mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to
each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with
the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism employs payments, the computation of the
payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanism needs to
maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments.
We present local computation mechanisms for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems:
(1) stable matching, (2) job scheduling, (3) combinatorial auctions for unit-demand and k-minded
bidders, and (4) the housing allocation problem.
For stable matching, some of our techniques may have implications to the global (non-LCA)
setting. Specifically, we show that when the men’s preference lists are bounded, we can achieve
an arbitrarily good approximation to the stable matching within a fixed number of iterations of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
1 Introduction
Assume that we would like to design an auction for millions of buyers and items. Alternatively, we have
a cloud of hundreds of thousands of computers on which we would like to schedule several millions
of jobs. In the not-so-distant past, these ideas would have been unthinkable, but today, technological
advances, especially the Internet, have led us to the point where they are not only possible, but necessary.
One can easily conceive a cloud computation with thousands of selfish computers, each one wanting to
minimize its work load. Alternatively, an ad-auction for millions of businesses competing for advertising
on millions of websites does not appear to be a far away dream. In cases like these, the data sets on which
we need to work are so large, that polynomial-time tractability may not be enough. Sometimes, even
computing a solution in linear time may be infeasible. Often, however, only parts of the solution to a
problem are required at each point in time. In such cases, we can use local computation algorithms
(LCAs).
Local computation algorithms, which were introduced by Rubinfeld et al. [RTVX11], consider the
scenario in which we need to be able to respond to queries (regarding a feasible solution) quickly, but we
never need the entire solution at once. For example, in most auctions, this is a reasonable assumption.
When queried, we need to be able to tell each buyer which items she received and how much to pay; for a
given item we need to tell the seller to whom and when to ship the item. There is no need to calculate the
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entire allocation and payment at any specific time or to commit the entire solution to memory. Having
an LCA to such an auction would mean that we can reply to queries in polylogarithmic time and only
require polylogarithmic space. Furthermore, if all of the items and buyers are queried, combining the
results will give us a complete solution that meets our requirements.
The field of algorithmic mechanism design is an area at the intersection of economic game theory
and algorithm design, whose objective is to design mechanisms in decentralized strategic environments.
These mechanisms need to take into account both the algorithmic efficiency considerations and the
selfish behavior of the participating agents.
In this paper we propose local computation mechanism design, which shares the motivations of both
local computation algorithms and algorithmic mechanism design. Our abstract model is the following:
We have a large data-set and a set of allowable queries. Our goal is to implement each query locally,
with polylogarithmic time and space, while maintaining the incentives of participants. It is worthwhile
to give a few illustrative examples:
1. Consider the problem of assigning doctor interns to hospitals internships, the classical motivation
for stable matching. We would like to be able to compute, for each doctor, her assigned hospital,
without performing the entire global computation.
2. Consider a large distributed data center that has to assign jobs to machines and elicits from each
machine its speed. When queried on a job, we would like to reply to which machine it is assigned,
and when queried regarding a machine, we would like to reply with the set of jobs that need to run
on it. Again, we would like the computation to be local, without constructing a global solution,
and still be able to ensure the machines have an incentive to report their speeds truthfully.
3. Consider a large auction (for instance, an ad auction platform). When queried regarding a bidder,
we would like to compute the items she receives and her payment; when queried on an item, we
would like to compute which bidder won it, and it’s price. Again, we would like guarantee that
the bidders have an incentive to report their preferences truthfully.
The following are our main contributions. First, we formalize the notion of local computation mech-
anism design. A mechanism is local if, for every query, it calculates an allocation (and a payment) in
polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the allocation must be consistent with some global so-
lution, and the payment must ensure truthfulness of the agents. Second, we present local computation
mechanisms for several interesting problems, where our main result is an LCA for stable matching.
Third, we use our techniques to show that in the general case when the men’s lists have bounded length
(even in cases that do not admit an LCA), we can find arbitrarily good matchings (up to both additive
and multiplicative constants) by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm to a constant number of rounds.
We provide LCAs for the following problems:
Stable matching In the stable matching (or stable marriage) problem, introduced by Gale and Shapley
[GS62], we would like to find a stable perfect matching between a group of n men and a group of n
women1. We focus on the model introduced by Immorlica and Mahdian [IM05], in which the the
women can have arbitrary preferences over the men, and the men have preference lists of length k over
the women, sampled uniformly at random.
Our main result is a local computation algorithm which matches all but an arbitrarily small fraction
of the participants (this is often called an almost stable matching; see, e.g., [TL84, LZ03]). Furthermore,
limited to the matched participants, the matching is stable.
1A blocking pair is a man m and a woman w such that m prefers w to the woman he is matched to, and w prefers m to the
man she is matched to. A matching is stable if there is no blocking pair.
2
Scheduling on related machines In the makespan minimization problem, we want to schedule n jobs
on m machines so as to minimize the maximal running time (makespan) of the machines. This problem
has many variations; we consider the scenario in which m identical jobs need to be allocated among n
related machines. The machines are strategic agents, whose private information is their speed. We show:
1. A local mechanism that is truthful in expectation for scheduling on related machines, which pro-
vides an O(log log n)-approximation to the optimal makespan.
2. A local mechanism that is universally truthful for the restricted case (i.e., when each job can run
on one of at most a constant number of predetermined machines), which provides anO(log log n)-
approximation to the optimal makespan.
We also show some subtle and surprising results on the truthfulness of our algorithms.
Matching combinatorial auctions Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are auctions in which buyers can
bid on bundles of items. We consider the following scenario: m items are to be auctioned off to n unit-
demand buyers, where each buyer is interested in a set of at most k items, sampled uniformly at random.
We show universally truthful local mechanisms for the following variations, both of which provide a
1/2-approximation to the optimal solution:
1. When all buyers have an identical valuation for the items in their sets, and the buyers’ private
information is the sets of items they are interested in.
2. When the sets are public knowledge, and the buyers’ private information is their valuation.
We also show that there cannot exist an (exact) LCA for maximum matching, and therefore, there
cannot exist any local mechanism which computes the optimal solution.
Combinatorial auctions with k-single minded bidders If each buyer is interested in a set of at most
k items, sampled uniformly at random, and has private valuation for this set, we show a universally
truthful local mechanism which gives a 1/k-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) We show that in the housing allocation setting, in which each
agent is interested in a constant number of houses, sampled uniformly at random, the RSD algorithm is
implementable as an LCA.
1.1 Related Work
Local Computation Algorithms: Rubinfeld et al. [RTVX11], showed how to transform distributed al-
gorithms to LCAs, and gave LCAs for several problems, including maximal independent set and hyper-
graph 2-coloring. Alon et al. [ARVX12], expanded the work of [RTVX11] and gave better space bounds
for maximal independent set and hypergraph 2-coloring, using query trees. Query trees were introduced
in the local setting by Nguyen and Onak [NO08]: a random permutation of the vertices is generated, and
a sequential algorithm is simulated on this order. The query tree represents the dependence of each query
on the results of previous queries. [NO08] showed that if the graph has a bounded degree, the query tree
has a constant expected size. [ARVX12] showed that the query tree has polylogarithmic size with high
probalility, and that the space required by the algorithm can be reduced by using a random seed to gener-
ate the ordering. Mansour et al. [MRVX12], showed that the size of the query tree can be bounded, with
high probability, by O(log n), and showed how it is possible to transform many on-line algorithms to
LCAs. Using this technique, they showed LCAs for maximal matching and several machine scheduling
problems. Mansour and Vardi [MV13], showed an LCA which finds a (1 − ǫ)-approximation to the
maximum matching.
Mechanism Design: We divide our attention between two types of mechanisms: with and without pay-
ments. When the mechanism designer can incorporate payments (to or from participating parties), these
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payments are usually used to guarantee incentive compatibility or “truthfulness” ([MCWG95], [NR99]):
the agents are rationally motivated to truthfully reveal their private information. The mechanisms with
payments discussed in this paper are all randomized, and there are several quantifications of truthful-
ness for such mechanisms in the literature, e.g., [FKKV13, HKV13]. We focus on the two most widely
accepted (e.g., [NR99, AT01, LOS02, DD09, DNS12]): truthfulness in expectation, in which the expec-
tation of each agent’s utility is maximized by being truthful (where the expectation is taken over the coin
flips of the mechanism), and universal truthfulness, where each agent’s utility is maximized by being
truthful, regardless of the realization of the randomness of the mechanism. When the mechanism does
not support payments, it is sometimes impossible to guarantee truthfulness without crippling restrictions
to the mechanism [Arr50]. In such cases, it is common to look at (Bayesian) ex-ante truthfulness2 , in
which the expectation of each agent’s utility is maximized by being truthful (where the expectation is
taken over the prior distribution of the other agents’ private information).
Mechanisms are generally required to run in time (and space) polynomial in the size of the input.
In cases when the optimal solution can be calculated in polynomial time and space, one can apply the
well-known VCG payments [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73]. Unfortunately, these payments can only be applied
when the optimal solution can be computed [NR99, LOS02], and in many cases, it has been shown that
computing an optimal solution is NP-hard [NR99, Dob11]. In these cases, we can only hope to design
algorithms that approximate the optimal solution in polynomial time.
Additional Related Work: Because of the large variety of game-theoretic settings considered in this
paper, instead of listing the entire glossary of related game-theoretic works here, we provide a short
subsection dedicated to related work pertaining to each topic at the start of the relevant sections.
1.2 Paper Organization
In Section 2 we give some general definitions and notation which we will use in the rest of the paper, and
present our model for local computation game theoretic mechanisms. In Section 3 we present our LCA
for stable matching. In Section 4 we show some properties of the (global) Gale-Shapley algorithm that
can be derived using our proof techniques. In Section 5, we show that our LCA for stable matching is
ex-ante truthful. In Section 6 we present LCAs for machine scheduling; in Section 7, we give LCAs for
combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders, and prove that there cannot be an LCA for maximum
matching; in Section 8 we extend the results of Section 7 to combinatorial auctions with single-minded
bidders. In Section 9, we give an LCA for random serial dictatorship, and finally, in Section 10, we
provide several interesting open questions for future research.
2 Our Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Local Computation Algorithms
The model we use is a generalization of the model of local computation algorithms (LCAs) introduced
in [RTVX11].3 A (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local computation algorithm LA for a computational problem is a
(randomized) algorithm that receives an input of size n, and a query x. Algorithm LA replies to query x
in time t(n) and uses at most s(n) memory, with probability at least 1− δ(n). Furthermore, the replies
to all of the possible queries are consistent and combine to a feasible solution to the problem. That is,
2Usually referred to in Economic literature as ex-ante efficiency.
3 Our model differs from the model of [RTVX11] in that their model requires that the LCA always obeys the time and
space bounds, and returns an error with some probability. It is easy to see that any algorithm which conforms to our model can
be modified to conform to the model of [RTVX11] by forcing it to return an error if the time or space bound is violated (the
other direction does not necessarily hold). Note however, that using this translation, a truthful mechanism in our model would
not necessarily translate to a truthful mechanism in the model of [RTVX11].
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the algorithm always replies correctly, but there is a δ(n) probability that the time and/or space bounds
will be violated.
2.2 Mechanism Design
We use the standard notation of game theoretic mechanisms. There is a set N of n rational agents and
a set M of m objects. In some settings, e.g., the stable marriage setting, there are no objects, only
rational agents. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function vi that maps subsets S ⊆ M of the items to
non-negative numbers. The utilities of the agents are quasi-linear, namely, when agent i receives subset
S of items and pays p, her utility is ui(S, p) = vi(S) − p. Agents are rational in the sense that they
select actions to maximize their utility. We would like to allocate items to agents (or possibly agents to
other agents), in order to meet global goal, e.g., maximize the sum of the valuations of allocated objects
(see, e.g., [NRTV05]).
A mechanism with payments M = (A,P) is composed of an allocation function A, which allocates
items to agents, and a payment scheme P, which assigns each agent a payment. A mechanism without
payments consists only of an allocation function. Agents report their bids to the mechanism. Given
the bids b = (b1, . . . , bn), the mechanism allocates the item subset Ai(b) ⊆ M to agent i, and, if the
mechanism is with payments, charges her Pi(b); the utility of agent i is ui(b) = vi(Ai(b))− Pi(b).
A randomized mechanism is universally truthful if for every agent i, for every random choice of
the mechanism, reporting her true private valuation maximizes her utility. A randomized mechanism is
truthful in expectation, if for every agent i, reporting her true private valuation maximizes her expected
utility. That is, for all agents i, any bids b−i and bi, E[ui(vi, b−i)] ≥ E[ui(bi, b−i)].
We say that an allocation function A admits a truthful payment scheme if there exists a payment
scheme P such that the mechanism M = (A,P) is truthful.
A mechanism M = (A,P) fulfills voluntary participation if, when the agent bids truthfully, the
utility of every agent is always non-negative, regardless of the other agents’ bids, i.e., for all agents i and
bids b−i, ui(vi, b−i) ≥ 0 .
2.3 Local Computation Mechanisms
Definition 2.1 (Mechanisms without payments). We say that a mechanism M is (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local
if its allocation function is computed by a (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local computation algorithm.
Definition 2.2 (Mechanisms with payments). We say that a mechanismM = (A,P) is (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-
local if both the allocation function A and the payment scheme P are computed by (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-
local computation algorithms.
In other words, given a query x, A computes an allocation and P computes a payment, and both run
in time t(n) and space s(n) with probability at least 1− δ(n). Furthermore, the replies of A to all of the
queries combine to a feasible allocation.
A truthful local mechanism M = (A,P) is a local mechanism which is also truthful. Namely, each
agent’s dominant bid is her true valuation, regardless of the fact that the mechanism is local.
3 Stable Matching
The stable matching problem is represented by a tuple A = (M,W,P ), where M is the set of men, W
is set of women, and P is the set of preference relations of the men and the women: each man m ∈ M
has a preference relation over the women: if m prefers w to w′ we denote this by w
m≻ w′. Similarly
there is a preference relationship
w≻ for each woman w.
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Related work Stable matching has been at the center of game-theoretic research since the seminal
paper of Gale ans Shapley [GS62] (see, e.g., [Rot03] for an introduction and a summary of many im-
portant results). Roth and Rothblum [RR99] examined the scenario in which the preference lists are of
bounded length; in most real-life scenarios, this is indeed the case. For example, a medical student will
not submit a preference list for internship over all of the hospitals in the United States. Furthermore, the
mechanism designer in most of these cases de facto decides on the list length because the mechanism
will usually require the men to submit a list of some predetermined length. It is known that a linear
number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is necessary to attain stability [GI89], and several
works address the situation when we are interested in a sublinear number of queries, for example Feder
et al. [FMP00] propose a parallel sublinear time algorithm for stable matching. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to convert their algorithm to a local computation algorithm. Several experimental works on
parallel algorithms for the stable matching problem provide evidence that after a constant number of
rounds, the matching is almost stable (e.g., [TL84, Qui85, LZ03]). Floreen et al. [FKPS10] show that
in the special case when both the mens’ and the womens’ preference lists are bound by a constant, there
exists a distributed version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can be run for a constant number of
rounds and finds an almost stable matching.
We examine the variant in which each man m ∈ M is interested in at most k women, (and prefers
to be unmatched than to be matched to anyone not on their list; cf. [RR99]). We limit our attention to
the setting in which the men’s preference are assumed to be uniformly distributed; cf. [IM05, KP09].
Definition 3.1. A matching H : M → W ∪ {⊥} is a function which is injective over W (but it is
possible that for several men mi, H(mi) =⊥ - these men are said to be unmatched).
A matching H is said to be stable if for every man m such that H(m) = w (possibly w =⊥), and every
w′ such that w′
m≻ w, then H−1(w′) w
′
≻ m. A couple (m,w′) is said to be unstable if ∃w ∈ W ∪ {⊥} :
H(m) = w, w′
m≻ w, and for m′ = H−1(w′), m w
′
≻ m′ (possibly m′ =⊥).
The stable matching problem (M,W,P ) where each man has a preference list of length k and each
woman is chosen uniformly at random is called k-uniform.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm finds a stable matching in the k-uniform setting (e.g., [GS85]). To
ensure the locality of our algorithm, we allow our mechanism to "disqualify" men, in which case they
remain unmatched, but are unable to contest the matching. We try, however, to keep the number of
disqualified men to a minimum. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.2. Let A = (M,W,P ) be a stable matching problem, |M | = |W | = n, in the k-uniform
setting. Then there is an (O(log n), O(log n), 1/n)-local computation mechanism for A in which at
most an O(1/k) fraction of the men remain unmatched.
We begin by describing a non-local algorithm, ABRIDGEDGS, and then show how to simulate it
locally by a local algorithm, LOCALAGS.
3.1 ABRIDGEDGS
Let ABRIDGEDGS be the Gale-Shapley men’s courtship algorithm, where, in addition to the preference
lists being of constant length, the algorithm is stopped after ℓ rounds. That is, in each round, each
unassigned man goes to the highest ranked woman who has not yet rejected him. Each woman then
keeps the man she prefers out of the men who approached her, and rejects the rest. This continues until
the ℓth round, and the men who were rejected on the ℓth round are disqualified. (Note that the men who
were rejected k times are left unmatched as well, but they are not said to be disqualified.) We simulate
ABRIDGEDGS using an LCA.
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3.2 LOCALAGS - an LCA implementation of ABRIDGEDGS
Consider a graph which represents the problem, where the men and the women are represented by
vertices, and an edge exists between two vertices if and only if they are on each other’s list. Define the
distance between two agents to be the length of the shortest path between them in the graph. Define the
d-neighborhood of a person v to be everyone at a distance at most d from v, denoted Nd(v)
Assume we are queried on a specific man, m1. We simulate ABRIDGEDGS locally as follows: Let
the number of rounds be ℓ = 2k2 (see Lemma 3.7). We look at the 2ℓ-neighborhood of m1. For each
man mi ∈ N2ℓ(m1), we simulate round 1. Then, for each man mi ∈ N2ℓ−2(m1), we simulate round 2.
And so on, until for mi ∈ N2(m1), that is, m1 and his closest male neighbors, we simulate round ℓ. We
return the woman to whom m1 is paired, “unassigned” if he was rejected by k women, and “disqualified”
if he was rejected by a woman in round ℓ. We denote this algorithm by LOCALAGS.
Claim 3.3. For any two men, mi and mj , whose distance from each other is greater than 2ℓ, mi’s
actions cannot affect mj if Algorithm ABRIDGEDGS terminates after ℓ rounds.
Proof. The proof is by induction. For ℓ = 1, let w1 be mj’s first choice. Only men for whom w1 is their
first choice can affect mj , and these are a subset of the men at distance 2 from mj . For the inductive
step, assume that the claim holds for ℓ− 1. Assume that there is a man mi whose actions can affect mj
within ℓ rounds, who is at a distance of at least 2ℓ+ 2 from mj . From the inductive claim, none of mi’s
actions can affect any of mj’s neighbors within ℓ − 1 rounds. As their actions in round ℓ − 1 (or any
previous round) will not be affected by mi, and they are the only ones who can affect mj in round ℓ, it
follows that mi cannot affect mj within ℓ rounds.
Corollary 3.4. The query of a man m’s status in round ℓ only needs to consider men at distance at most
2ℓ from m.
Lemma 3.5. The running time and space of algorithm LOCALAGS is O(log n) with probability at least
1− 1/n2.
We prove the following claim, which immediately implies Lemma 3.5.
Claim 3.6. For sufficiently large n, for any integer i > 0, there exists a constant ci such Pr[|Ni(v)| ≤
ci log n] ≥ 1− 1/n2 .
Proof. Let N iv be the random variable representing the number of vertices in the i-neighborhood of
vertex v. Note that as the degree of a women v is distributed binomially N1v ∼ B(n, k/n) and E[N1v ] =
k. We prove by induction that Pr[N iv ≤ ci(log n)] ≥ 1− in3 .
For the base, i = 1, if v is a man, N1v = k. If v is a woman, we employ the Chernoff bound with
λ > 2e− 1:4 Pr[N1v > (1 + λ)k] < 2−kλ. Therefore, for c1 = 4 and for n ≥ 2k,
Pr[N1v > c1 log n] ≤ 2−c1 logn+k <
2k
nc1
≤ 1
n3
,
Assuming that the claim holds for all integers smaller than i, we show that it holds for i. If the
outermost vertices of the neighborhood are men, then N iv ≤ kN i−1v and we can take ci = kci−1.
Otherwise, we use the law of total probability.
Pr[N iv > ci log n] =Pr[N
j
v > ci log n|N i−1v ≤ ci−1 log n] Pr[N i−1v ≤ ci−1 log n]
+ Pr[N jv > ci log n|N j−1v > ci−1 log n] Pr[N j−1v > ci−1 log n]
≤Pr[N jv > ci log n|N j−1v ≤ ci−1 log n] + Pr[N j−1v > ci−1 log n]
≤Pr[N jv > ci log n|N j−1v ≤ ci−1 log n] +
i− 1
n3
.
4This bound is reached by substituting λ ≥ 2e− 1 into the standard Chernoff bound Pr[X > (1 + λ)µ] ≤
(
eλ
(1+λ)1+λ
)µ
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where the last inequality uses the inductive hypothesis.
The probability that the degree of any node u is exactly z is at most
Pr[deg(u) = z] ≤
(
n
z
)(
k
n
)z
≤
(
ek
z
)z
,
using the inequality
(n
k
) ≤ (nek )k. Hence, for z ≥ e2k we have that Pr[deg(u) = z] ≤ e−z and
Pr[deg(u) = z] ≤ e−ẑ , where ẑ = max{0, z − e2k}.
We like to bound the probability that N iv is larger than ci log n although N i−1v is less than ci−1 log n.
We define a new random variable N̂ iv as follows. Let y ≤ ci−1 log n be the number of nodes at distance
i − 1 from v and let z = (z1, z2, . . . , zy) be their degrees. We define the truncated degrees as ẑ =
{ẑ1, ẑ2, . . . , ẑy} such that ẑj = max{0, zj − e2k}. The value of N̂ iv is the sum of the truncated degrees
at distance i−1 from v, i.e., N̂ iv =
∑y
i=1 ẑi. Clearly N iv ≤ N̂ iv+e2ky ≤ N̂ iv+ci−1e2k log n. Therefore
it is sufficient to bound N̂ iv.
Let x̂ =
∑y
i=1 ẑi. The probability that the truncated degrees of the vertices at distance i − 1 are
exactly ẑ = (ẑ1, ẑ2, . . . , ẑy) is at most
∏y
i=1 e
−ẑi = e−x̂. There are
(
x̂+y
y
)
vectors ẑ that can realize x̂.
We bound Pr[N̂ iv = x̂|N i−1v ≤ y], for x̂ ≥ 7y as follows:
Pr[N̂ iv = x̂|N i−1v ≤ y] ≤
(
x̂+ y
y
)
e−x̂ ≤
(
e · (x̂+ x̂/7)
x̂/7
)x̂/7
e−x̂ = e−(1−(1+ln(8))/7)x̂ ≤ e−x̂/2,
It follows that
Pr[N̂ iv ≥ 7y|N i−1v ≤ y] ≤
∞∑
x̂=7y
e−x̂/2 =
e−7y/2
1− e−1/2 ≤ e
−y ≤ 1/n3,
which follows since ci−1 ≥ 3. Therefore for ci = (e2k + 7)ci−1 ≤ (16k)i we have,
Pr[N iv > ci log n] ≤
1
n3
+
i− 1
n3
=
i
n3
.
Claim 3.6 implies Algorithm LOCALAGS makes O(log n) queries with probability at least 1/n2,
and so Lemma 3.5 follows.
Lemma 3.7. In Algorithm LOCALAGS, setting ℓ = 2k2 ensures at most 4n/k men remain unmatched
with probability at least 1− 1
n2
.
Note: This implies that the mechanism can limit the number of unmatched pairs with a high degree
of certainty by specifying the length of the list.
Lemmas 3.5 and 3.7 imply Theorem 3.2. We prove Lemma 3.7 in the following subsection; the
proof follows from Claims 3.9 and 3.11.
3.3 Bounding the number of men removed
To prove Lemma 3.7, we bound the number of men remaining unassigned due to the fact that the lists
are short, and the number of men disqualified due to the number of rounds being bounded.
8
3.3.1 Removal due to short lists
We bound the number of unpaired women as a result of the fact that the lists are short, using the principle
of deferred decisions [Knu76]5. Note that the number of unpaired women equals the number of unpaired
men.
Lemma 3.8. In the k-uniform setting, the Gale-Shapley algorithm results in at most 2nk men being
unpaired, with probability at least 1− 1/2n2.
Proof. Consider the following stochastic process: in the first round, each of the n men chooses a woman
independently and uniformly at random. For each consecutive round, for each woman that has been
chosen by at least one man, one of the men remains married to her (arbitrarily chosen), and the others
remain single and choose again. This process repeats for k rounds. This is modeled by the functions
f t : M → W , where in round t, f t maps each single man to a woman uniformly at random and each
married man to the same woman. Let F be the set of all possible allocation functions f :M →W .
For ease of analysis, we assume that each man can choose the same woman again, as the number
of free women in this case is an upper bound to the number of free women in the system where he can
not. Note that the number of unmatched men after t rounds is identical to the number of unmatched men
after t rounds of the Gale-Shapley process. This stochastic process, however, terminates after k rounds,
whereas the Gale-Shapley process can continue. As the number of matched men can only increase when
more rounds are added, the number of unmatched men created by the process is an upper bound to the
number of unmatched men created by the Gale-Shapley process.
Let Xtj be the indicator variable which is 1 if woman j is unassigned at the end of round t. Let
Xt =
∑n
j=1X
t
j . The following claim implies Lemma 3.8.
Claim 3.9. For any constant t, Pr[Xt > 2nt ] ≤ tn3 .
Proof. The proof is by induction. The base of the induction, t = 1, is immediate. For the inductive
step, assume that after round t, Xt = n/z (for some z > 0). In round t + 1, E[Xt+1|Xt = nz ] =
n
z (1− 1/n)n/z . By the inductive hypothesis
Pr
[
Xt >
2n
t
]
≤ t
n3
. (1)
For the rest of the proof, assume Xt ≤ 2nt , and fix Xt to be some such value. We get
E[Xt+1|Xt ≤ 2n
t
] ≤ 2n
t
(1− 1/n)2n/t < n
t/2 · e2/t <
2n
t+ 2
, (2)
using ex > 1 + x.
Order the women arbitrarily, (W = {1, 2, . . . n}), and let Wi = {1, 2, . . . i}. For h ∈ F , define the
martingale
Y t+1i (h) = E[X
t+1(f t+1)|f t+1(j) = h(j) for all j ∈Wi],
where Xt+1(f t+1) is the realization of Xt+1 given that the allocation vector is f t+1. Note that Y t+10 (h)
is the expected value ofXt+1 over all possible functions f t+1; that is, the expected number of unmatched
women after t + 1 rounds. Y t+1n (h) is the number of unmatched women after t + 1 rounds when the
allocation function is h. Xt+1 satisfies the Lipschitz condition, because if h and h′ only differ on the
allocation of one man, |Xt+1(h) −Xt+1(h′)| ≤ 1. Therefore
|Y t+1i+1 (h)− Y t+1i (h)| ≤ 1,
5Instead of “deciding” on the preference lists in advance, each man chooses the (i + 1)th woman on his list only if he is
rejected from the ith - this mechanism is known to be equivalent to the mechanism which we use (see, e.g., [Knu76]).
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(see, e.g. [AS08]), and so we can apply Azuma’s inequality, from which we get
Pr[|Xt+1 − E[Xt+1]| > λ√n] < 2e−λ2/2.
Setting λ = 2
√
n
(t+1)(t+2) , we have that
Pr
[
|Xt+1 − E[Xt+1]| > 2n
(t+ 1)(t+ 2)
]
< 2e−n/(81t
4),
for constant t ≥ 2.
Therefore, since we assume that E[Xt+1] < 2nt+2 ,
Pr
[
Xt+1 >
2n
t+ 1
]
< 2e−n/(81t
4) <
1
n3
. (3)
Note that
Pr
[
Xt+1 >
2n
t+ 1
]
= Pr
[
Xt+1 >
2n
t+ 1
|Xt ≤ 2n
t
]
Pr
[
Xt ≤ 2n
t
]
+ Pr
[
Xt+1 >
2n
t+ 1
|Xt > 2n
t
]
Pr
[
Xt >
2n
t
]
From the induction hypothesis and Equations (1), (2) and (3), using the union bound,
Pr
[
Xt+1 >
2n
t+ 1
]
≤ t
n3
+
1
n3
≤ t+ 1
n3
.
The stochastic process for which Claim 3.9 holds ends at least as early as the Gale-Shapley algorithm
with short lists; therefore Claim 3.9 implies Lemma 3.8
3.3.2 Removal due to the number of rounds being limited
Because we stop the LOCALAGS algorithm after a constant (ℓ) number of rounds, it is possible that
some men who “should have been” matched are disqualified because they were rejected by their ith
choice in round ℓ (i < k). We show that this number cannot be very large.
Let Ri denote the number of men rejected in round i ≥ 1.
Observation 3.10. Ri is monotone decreasing in i.
Claim 3.11. The number of men rejected in round i is at most nki .
Proof. As each man can be rejected at most k times, the total number of rejections possible is kn. The
number of men who can be rejected in round i is at most
Ri ≤ kn−
i−1∑
j=1
Rj ⇒ Ri ≤ kn− (i− 1)Ri ⇒ Ri ≤ nk
i
(4)
Where Inequality 4 is due to Observation 3.10.
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4 Some general properties of the Gale-Shapley algorithm
We use the results and ideas of Section 3 to prove some interesting features of the (general) Gale-Shapley
stable matching algorithm, when the mens’ lists are of length at most k. (These results immediately
extend to our local version of the algorithm, LOCALAGS.) Note that the proof of Claim 3.11 makes no
assumption on how the men’s selection is made, and therefore, Claim 3.11 implies that as long as each
man’s list is bounded by k, if we run the Gale-Shapley for ℓ rounds, at most nkℓ men will be rejected
in that round. This immediately gives us an additive approximation bound for the algorithm if we stop
after ℓ rounds.
Corollary 4.1 (to Claim 3.11). Assume that the output of the Gale-Shapley algorithm on a stable match-
ing problem, where the preference lists of the men are of length at most k, is a matching of sizeM∗. Then,
stopping the Gale Shapley algorithm after ℓ rounds will result in a matching of size at least M∗ − nkℓ .
We would like to also provide a multiplicative bound. Henceforth, we assume that the mens’ list
length is bounded by k, but make no other assumptions. For each round i, let Mi be the size of the
current matching; let Di be the number of men who have already approached all k women on their list
and have been rejected by all of them; let Ci be the number of men who were rejected by women in
round i, but have approached fewer than k women so far; recall that Ri is the number of men rejected in
round i. Denote the size of the matching returned by the un-truncated Gale-Shapley algorithm by M∗.
Claim 4.2. Ck+1 ≤ kM∗.
Proof. Note that Ri = Ci + Di − Di−1. For i < k,Di = 0. As Mi is monotonically increasing,
∀i ≤ k,Ri ≥ n−M∗.
k∑
i=1
Ri ≥ kn− kM∗.
Hence,
Ck+1 ≤ kn−
k∑
i=1
Ri ≤ kM∗.
Corollary 4.3. For every ǫ > 0, there exists a constant ℓ > 0 such that Cℓ ≤ ǫM∗.
Proof. Denote the maximum number of rejections possible from round i onwards by Li. Clearly,
Li ≤ k(Mi + Ci) ≤ k(M∗ + Ci).
For all i such that Ci ≥ ǫM∗, we have
Li ≤
(
1 +
1
ǫ
)
kCi.
Therefore, from Claim 4.2,
Lk+1 ≤
(
1 +
1
ǫ
)
k2M∗.
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Putting everything together, we have,
Li+1 ≤ Li − Ci
⇒ Li+1 ≤ Li
(
1− 1
k(1 + 1ǫ )
)
⇒ Lk+i+1 ≤ Lk
(
1− 1
k(1 + 1ǫ )
)i
≤
(
1 +
1
ǫ
)
k2M∗
(
1− 1
k(1 + 1ǫ )
)i
≤ 2k2M∗e−
i
k(1+ 1ǫ ) ,
Taking i = k(1 + 1ǫ ) log
2k2
ǫ gives Ck+i+1 ≤ Lk+i+1 ≤ ǫM∗.
This gives us,
Theorem 4.4. Consider a stable matching problem. Let each man’s list be bounded by k. Denote
the size of the stable matching returned by the Gale-Shapley algorithm by M∗. Then, if the process is
stopped after O(kǫ log kǫ ) rounds, the matching returned is at most a (1 + ǫ)-approximation to M∗, and
has at most ǫM∗ unstable couples.
Corollary 4.5. If both men and women have lists of length at most k, then for any ǫ there is an
(O(1), O(1), 0)-LCA for stable matching which returns a matching that is at most a (1+ǫ)-approximation
to the matching returned by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, and with at most an ǫ-fraction of the edges be-
ing unstable.
5 Ex-ante truthfulness of LocalAGS
It is known that the Gale-Shapley men’s courtship algorithm is strategy-proof for the men but not for
the women (see, e.g., [MSZ13]). Unfortunately, Algorithm LOCALAGS is neither strategy-proof for
the men nor for the women: for the women, this follows immediately from the fact that the men’s
courtship algorithm is not strategy-proof; for the men - a man who was rejected in round ℓ might prefer
to not declare the woman from which he was rejected in that round. It is possible, though, to show
that LOCALAGS is ex-ante truthful. The men have a preference relation over the women (and women
over the men). However, it is not clear how to calculate the expected utility in this case, so for the
purposes of the proof, assume the men have a utility function u : W → R. The utility of the men for
women not among their first k preferences is 0. Note that LOCALAGS has no access to the utilities
themselves, but only to the preferences, therefore the only way for a man to manipulate the algorithm is
by misrepresenting his preference vector.
Assume that man m’s real utility function is tm, but he declares bm. Denote the set of all the
possible preference vectors of the other players by B−m. Let b−m ∈ B−m be a single realization
of the preference vectors of the other players. Let b = (bm, b−m). The outcome of instance b is
deterministically determined; denote the utility of m for instance b by um(b). (um(b) = tm(w) if
m is paired with woman w and 0 otherwise.) Denote the expected utility of m when he bids bm by
um(bm) =
∑
b−m∈B−m
um(b) · Pr[b−m].
Definition 5.1. A transformation of a utility function by swapping the utilities of two women is called a
swap.
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Observation 5.2. It is possible to convert any preference vector v to any other preference vector v′ by
a finite series of swaps.
This implies that given that a utilities function has a fixed list of outcomes, it is possible to reach any
permutation of the utilities from any other by a finite series of swaps.
Claim 5.3. Algorithm LOCALAGS is ex-ante truthful for the men.
Proof. Assume that man m gains by declaring his utility function to be bm, over his true function, tm,
where bm is a permutation of tm. That is, um(bm) > um(tm). (Recall that m can make no better
manipulations.)
Take any legal chain of swaps from tm to bm: < tm = u1, u2, . . . ui, . . . , un = bm >. There must
be two consecutive functions, ui and ui+1 on the chain, for which
um(u
i+1) > um(u
i), (5)
from the transitivity of the relation “>”. Functions ui and ui+1 differ in the utilities of two women, say
wx and wy: ui(wx) = ui+1(wy), ui(wy) = ui+1(wx).
Denote by B′−m the set of all preferences which is reached by taking B−m and interchanging women
wx andwy wherever they appear. Likewise the preference vectors of womenwx andwy are interchanged.
Note that B−m = B′−m, because they are both uniform distributions over all possible preference vectors.
By symmetry, it must hold that
um(u
i) > um(u
i+1),
in contradiction to Equation (5).
Similarly,
Claim 5.4. Algorithm LOCALAGS is ex-ante truthful for the women.
The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 5.3, and is omitted.
6 Local machine scheduling
In this section we consider the following job scheduling setting. There is a set M of n machines (or
“bins”) and a set J of m uniform jobs (or “balls”). Each machine i ∈ M has an associated capacity
ci (also referred to as its “speed”). We assume that the capacities are positive integers. Given that hi
jobs are allocated to machine i, its load is ℓi = hi/ci. (hi is referred to as the height of machine i.) The
utility of machine i is quasi-linear, namely, when it has load ℓi and receives payment pi then its utility is
ui(ℓi, pi) = pi − ℓi.
The makespan of an allocation is maxi{ℓi} = maxi{hi/ci}. In our setting, the players are the
machines and their private information is their true capacities. Each machine i submits a bid bi (which
represents its capacity). Our goal is to elicit from the machines the information about their capacities, in
order to minimize the makespan of the resulting allocation.
For any allocation algorithm A, define A(b) to be the allocation vector, which, given bid vector b,
assigns each job j ∈ J to a unique machine i ∈ M. Let Aj(b) be the machine to which job j is
allocated in A. When the bids b−i are fixed, we sometimes omit them from the notation for clarity.
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Related work Azar et al., [ABKU99] proposed the GREEDY[d] algorithm in the online setting, where
m balls need to be allocated to n bins, with the objective of minimizing the makespan: each ball chooses,
uniformly at random, d bins, and allocates itself to the least loaded bin among its d choices at the
time of its arrival. They also showed that the maximal load is Θ(m/n) + (1 + o(1)) ln lnn/ ln d. A
large volume of work has been devoted to variations on this problem, such as adding weights to the
balls [TW07]; and variations on the algorithm, such as the non-uniform ball placement strategies of
Vöcking [Vöc03]. Of particular relevance to this work is the case of non-uniform bins: Berenbrink et al.
[BBFN14], showed that in this case the maximum load can also be bounded by Θ(m/n) + O(ln lnn).
Hochbaum and Shmoys [HS88] showed a PTAS for scheduling on related machines. Lenstra et al.
[LST87], presented a 2-approximation algorithm for scheduling on unrelated machines and showed that
the optimal allocation is not approximable to within 32 − ǫ. The problem of finding a truthful mechanism
for scheduling (on unrelated machines) was introduced by Nisan and Ronen,[NR99], who showed an
m-approximation to the problem, and a lower bound of 2. Archer and Tardos [AT01] were the first to
tackle the related machine case; they showed a randomized 3-approximation polynomial algorithm and
a polynomial pricing scheme to derive a mechanism that is truthful in expectation. Since then, much
work has gone into finding mechanisms with improved approximation ratios, until Christodoulou and
Kovács [CK10] recently settled the problem by showing a deterministic PTAS, and a corresponding
mechanism that is deterministically truthful. Babaioff et al. [BKS10], showed how to transform any
monotone allocation rule for single parameter agents to a truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
Definition 6.1. (Monotonicity) A randomized allocation function A is monotone in expectation if for
any machine i, and any bids b−i of the other machines, the expected load of machine i, E[ℓi(bi, b−i)], is
a non-decreasing function of bi.
A randomized allocation function A is universally monotone if for any machine i, and any bids b−i
of the other machines, the load of machine i, ℓi(bi, b−i), is a non-decreasing function of bi for any
realization of the randomization of the allocation function.
Given an allocation function A, we would like to provide a payment scheme P to ensure that our
mechanism M = (A,P) is truthful. It is known that a necessary and sufficient condition is that the
allocation function A is monotone.
Theorem 6.2. [Mye81, AT01]) The allocation algorithm A admits a payment scheme P such that the
mechanism M = (A,P) is truthful-in-expectation (universally truthful) if and only if A is monotone in
expectation (universally monotone).
We differentiate between two settings. The standard setting (cf. [BBFN14, Wie07]) is a slight
variation on the basic power-of-d choices setting proposed in [ABKU99], for some constant d ≥ 2.
For each job j, the mechanism chooses a subset Mj ⊆ M, |Mj | = d of machines that the job can be
allocated to. The probability that machine i ∈Mj is proportional to bi.
In the restricted setting (cf. [ANR95]), each job can be allocated to a subset of at most d machines,
where the subsets Mj are given as an input to the allocation algorithm. The restricted setting models the
case when the jobs have different requirements, and there is only a small subset of machines that can
run each job.
Mansour et at. [MRVX12], showed that it is possible to transform any on-line algorithm on a graph
of bounded degree (or whose degree is distributed binomially) to an LCA. The idea behind the reduction
is simple: generate a random permutation on the vertices and simulate the on-line algorithm on this
permutation. They show that, with high probability, this results in at most O(log n) queries. We require
the following theorem from [MRVX12].
Theorem 6.3. [MRVX12] Consider a generic on-line algorithm LB which requires constant time per
query, for n balls and m bins, where n = cm for some constant c > 0. There exists an (O(log4 n),
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O(log3 n), 1/n)-local computation algorithm which, on query of a (ball) vertex v ∈ V , allocates v a
(bin) vertex u ∈ U , such that the resulting allocation is identical to that of LB.6
6.1 A truthful in expectation mechanism for the standard setting
For the presentation of the allocation algorithm, we regard the allocation field as consisting of slots
of size 1. Each machine i’s bid bi represents the number of slots it “owns”. Given the bids b of the
machines, let B =
∑n
i=1 bi. Thus, we can treat this as B slots of size 1 each, where each machine i
owns bi slots. In the allocation, we will allocate jobs to slots. When a job j is allocated to a specific
slot, this means that the machine that owns the slot receives j. We provide the following simple on-line
allocation algorithm ASLMS (cf. [BBFN14]):
1. Choose for job j a subset Mj of d slots out of B, where each slot has equal probability. (Note that
Mj may include different slots owned by the same machine.)
2. Given Mj , job j is allocated to the least loaded slot in Mj (breaking ties uniformly at random).
Slots are treated as being independent of their machines. That is, it is possible that if a job chooses
two slots a and b, which belong to machines A andB, a has fewer jobs than b, butB is more loaded
than A, in terms of the average of the loads of its slots.
Note: Although it may not be possible to compute B and Mj locally exactly, it has been shown in that an
approximate calculation suffices (e.g., [BCM03, Wie07]). The reader is invited to peruse the references
herein for a more in-depth discussion.
Lemma 6.4. The randomized allocation function ASLMS is monotone in expectation.
Proof. Let B =∑i′ bi′ and B−i =∑i′ 6=i bi′ . Since all the slots are identical, by symmetry the expected
number of jobs allocated to each slot is exactly m/B. Since machine i owns bi slots, the expected height
of machine i is
E[hi(bi)] =
bi
B−i + bi
m,
which is monotone increasing in bi (for bi, B−i ≥ 0).
From Theorem 6.2, we immediately get:
Lemma 6.5. The randomized allocation function ASLMS admits a payment scheme PSLMS such that
the mechanism MSLMS = (ASLMS,PSLMS) is truthful in expectation.
It is interesting to note that the above algorithm does not admit a universally truthful mechanism. To
show this, we prove a slightly stronger claim: that the GREEDY algorithm of [ABKU99], (in which each
job chooses d machines at random, and is allocated to the least loaded among them, post placement7,
breaking ties arbitrarily), does not admit a universally truthful mechanism.
Claim 6.6. Algorithm GREEDY is not universally monotone.
Proof. Assume we have 4 machines: A, B, C , and D, with bids 4, 4, 8 and 1 respectively. The first
2 jobs choose machines A and D (which we abbreviate to AD), the next 2 jobs choose BD, and the
next 6 jobs choose CD. After these 10 jobs, the heights of the machines are (2, 2, 6, 0) (recall that the
Greedy algorithm allocates according to the post-placement load). The 11th job chooses AB, and the
12th job chooses AC . As ties are broken at random, assume machine A receives job 11. Machine C
then receives job 12, making the capacities (3, 2, 7, 0).
6We need an assumption that each ball restricted to a constant number of machines, either explicitly or implicitly through
the algorithm LB.
7That is, if bin A has capacity 4 and height 2 and bin B has capacity 8 and height 5, the job will go to machine B.
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Now assume machine C bids 9, and the choices of the first 10 jobs and the 12th job remain the
same, but because C bid higher, now the 11th job chooses C instead of A (so job 11 chooses BC). Now
machine B receives the 11th job and machine A receives the 12th job, making the capacities (3, 3, 6, 0).
Machine C received less jobs although it was bidding higher!
Corollary 6.7. Algorithm ASLMS is not universally monotone.
By Theorem 6.3, the allocation function ASLMS can be transformed to a (O(log4 n), O(log3 n),
1/n) LCA. We would now like to show a payment scheme PSLMS such that the mechanism MSLMS =
(ASLMS ,PSLMS) is a local mechanism. (We overload the notation, letting ASLMS represent both the
on-line allocation algorithm and its respective LCA.) We therefore need to show a payment scheme
which can be implemented in an LCA and guarantees truthfulness. Our payment schemes are similar in
idea to the payments schemes of [APTT03] and [BBFN14].
Lemma 6.8. There exists a randomized local payment schemePSLMS such that the mechanismMSLMS =
(ASLMS,PSLMS) is truthful in expectation. Furthermore, if all the bids are bounded by a polyloga-
rithmic function, there exists a deterministic local payment scheme PSLMS such that the mechanism
MSLMS = (ASLMS,PSLMS) is truthful in expectation.
Proof. Archer and Tardos [AT01] showed that the following payment scheme makes for a truthful mech-
anism fulfilling voluntary participation. For bid bi:
pi(bi, b−i) = bihi(bi, b−i) +
∫ bi
0
hi(x, b−i)dx .
This has to be the expected payment, and we can (deterministically) take hi(b) to be the expected height
of machine i when it bids bi. Since E[hi(b)] = m biB−i+bi , where B−i =
∑
i′ 6=i bi′ , the payment is of the
form:
pi(bi, b−i) = m
b2i
B−i + bi
+
bi∑
x=0
hi(x, b−i)
= m
b2i
B−i + bi
+m
bi∑
x=0
x
B−i + x
.
Our remaining challenge is to compute the payment in polylogarithmic time and space.
If bi is bounded by some polylogarithmic function of n, we can calculate the sum in polylogarith-
mic time and space, and take this to be the payment. If, however, bi is larger, it is not apparent how
to calculate this sum in a straightforward fashion.8 We provide the following (randomized) payment
scheme:
Choose, uniformly at random, k ∈ [1, bi], and take the payment to be
m
b2i
B
+mbi · k
B−i + k
This gives the correct expected payment, and takes O(1) time.
[BBFN14], showed that ASLMS provides an O(log log n) approximation to the optimal makespan.
Therefore, by Theorem 6.3, the LCA of ASLMS provides the same approximation ratio. Combining
Lemma 6.5, and Lemma 6.8, we state our main result for the standard setting:
Theorem 6.9. There exists an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n)- local mechanism to scheduling on related
machines in the standard setting that is truthful in expectation, and provides anO(log log n)-approximation
to the makespan.
8We can approximate the payment up to an additive factor of 1/B−i using pi(bi, b−i) ≈ m b
2
i
B
−i+bi
+m(bi−B−i ln(1 +
bi/B−i)), but this might change the incentives of the machines and is not guaranteed to be truthful.
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6.2 A universally truthful mechanism for the restricted setting
In the restricted setting, each job can only be allocated to one of a set Mj ⊆ M of d machines. As
opposed to the standard setting, Mj is not selected by the mechanism, but is part of the input. We
assume that the allocation is random (this is necessary to bound the query tree size), and the probability
of machine i to be in Mj is proportional to its capacity ci (necessary to guarantee the approximation
ratio of the allocation algorithm ARLMS)9. The latter requirement can be relaxed slightly, but for clarity
of the proofs, we will assume that it holds exactly. Furthermore, we assume that the capacity of each
machine is not too large, that is, each machine has capacity at most O(log n). We restrict our attention to
the case where we would like to allocate m = Ω(C) jobs where C is the total capacity of the machines.
This is usually considered to be the worst case scenario (see e.g., [ABKU99, BBFN14, Wie07]). We
define the following (on-line) algorithm ARLMS for assigning jobs to machines as follows. Initially, we
select a permutation π of the machines, for tie-breaking. Place job t in the machine i ∈ Mj for which
the post-placement load, lpt+1i (bi) = ⌊h
t
i(bi)+1
bi
⌋ is smallest, breaking ties according to π. The following
claim shows why it is necessary to take the floor of the load, as the simple Greedy algorithm does not
admit a universally truthful mechanism in this case.
Claim 6.10. The GREEDY algorithm (unmodified) is not universally monotone in the restricted case.
Proof. Assume we have 3 machines A,B,C , with bids (4, 8, 36) respectively, and a tie-breaking per-
mutation: A < B < C (Jobs always prefer machine A to machines B and C , and machine B to
machine C). The allocation until time t has caused the heights to be (1, 3, 18). The next job’s choices
are machines A and B (which we abbreviate to AB), and the following two jobs’ choices are BC and
AB respectively. The first job is allocated to A (since the post-placement loads on A and B are 2/4
and 4/8 respectively, and 2/4 = 4/8, we use the tie-breaking rule). The second job is allocated to B
(4/8 < 19/36) and the third job to B (5/8 > 3/4). The heights of the machines are now (2, 5, 18).
Now let B declare its capacity to be 9, and assume that until time t, there is no difference in the
allocation. The loads at time t in this case are: 1/4, 3/9, 18/36. The jobs’ choices are part of the input
to the mechanism, so are unaffected by the bids, and remain AB,BC,AB. The first job is allocated to
B (2/4 > 4/9), the second job to C (19/36 < 20/36 = 5/9), and the third job to A (2/4 < 5/9). The
heights of the machines are now (2, 4, 19). Thus, B gets fewer jobs after bidding higher.
Theorem 6.11. For any permutation π of the machines and any job arrival order, the allocation function
ARLMS is universally monotone increasing in the machines’ bids.
From Definition 6.1, it suffices to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6.12. For any machine i, fixing b−i, for any b′i > bi, we have that hi(ARLMS(b′i, b−i)) ≥
hi(ARLMS(bi, b−i)).
To prove Lemma 6.12, define Dt(k, b′i, bi) to be the difference in the number of jobs allocated to
machine k betweenARLMS(b′i) andARLMS(bi) up to and including time t. We abbreviate this to Dt(k)
when b′i and bi are clear from the context. (If machine k received less jobs, then Dt(k) is negative.) We
say that machine k steals a job from machine l at time t if AtRLMS(bi) = l and AtRLMS(b′i) = k. We
will show that the only machine for which Dt(k) can be positive at some time t is machine i, therefore,
as
∑n
j=1D
t(j) = 0, we have that Dt(i) can never be negative.
Proposition 6.13. For any machine i, fixing b−i, if b′i > bi then at all times t, for any machine k 6= i,
Dt(k) ≤ 0.
9Although this assumption is somewhat strong for a theoretical discussion, from a practical viewpoint it usually holds that
a machines’ capacity is somewhat proportional to the number of jobs that is usually scheduled on it.
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Informally, Proposition 6.13 says that if bin i claims its capacity is larger than it actually is, no bin
except for i can receive more balls. The following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 6.13,
and implies Lemma 6.12.
Corollary 6.14. For any machine i, fixing b−i, if b′i > bi then at all times t, Dt(i) ≥ 0.
Before proving Proposition 6.13, we first will make the following simple observation
Observation 6.15. For any machine k, if Dt(k) ≤ 0 then lptk(b′i) ≤ lptk(bi).
Proof. For k 6= i, as k’s bid is the same in both allocations, if it received less jobs by time t in
ARLMS(bi) then the claim follows. If k = i, the claim follows since b′i > bi.
We now prove Proposition 6.13:
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. At t = 1, D1(k) = 0 for every k.
Assume the proposition is true for times t = 1, . . . , τ − 1. We show it holds for t = τ , by contra-
diction. Assume that we have a machine k 6= i such that Dτ (k) > 0. At time τ − 1, for all k 6= i, by
the induction hypothesis, it holds that Dτ−1(k) ≤ 0. The only way that Dτ (k) > 0 is if machine k has
Dτ−1(k) = 0 and at time τ steals a job. Assume first that machine k steals a job from machine l 6= i.
This means that in ARLMS(bi), machine l received job τ , therefore
lpτl (bi) ≤ lpτk(bi). (6)
By Observation 6.15, lpτl (b′i) ≤ lpτl (bi), and so
lpτl (b
′
i) ≤ lpτl (bi) ≤ lpτk(bi) = lpτk(b′i).
If machine k steals job τ from machine l, then lpτk(b′i) ≤ lpτl (b′i). This is in contradiction to Equation
(6) because there cannot be an equality both here and in Equation (6), as the tie-breaking permutation
π is fixed. More precisely, if lpτl (b′i) = lpτl (bi) = lpτk(bi) = lpτk(b′i), then job τ will be allocated to the
same machine in bi and b′i, according to the permutation π.
Therefore, machine k must steal job τ from machine i, which gives us
lpτi (bi) ≤ lpτk(bi) = lpτk(b′i) ≤ lpτi (b′i). (7)
The first inequality is due to the fact that machine i receives job τ in ARLMS(bi). The equality is due to
the fact that Dτ−1(k) = 0, and the second inequality is because machine k receives job τ inARLMS(b′i).
And so,
lpτi (bi) < lp
τ
i (b
′
i), (8)
because one of the inequalities in Equation (7) must be strict, as the tie-breaking permutation π is fixed.
Assume that the last time before τ that machine i stole a job is time ρ, and label by z the machine
that i stole from at that time. We have
lpρi (b
′
i) ≤ lpρz(b′i) ≤ lpρz(bi) ≤ lpρi (bi).
The first inequality is because machine i received job ρ inARLMS(b′i). The middle inequality is because
Dρ(z) ≤ 0. The last inequality is because machine z received job ρ in ARLMS(bi). Again, at least one
inequality must be strict, giving
lpρi (b
′
i) < lp
ρ
i (bi),
which implies, for all α ≥ 0, ⌊
hρi (b
′
i) + α+ 1
b′i
⌋
≤
⌊
hρi (bi) + α
bi
⌋
, (9)
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since b′i > bi ≥ 1.
Because job ρ was the last job that machine i stole, it received at least as many jobs between ρ and
τ in ARLMS(bi) as in ARLMS(b′i). Label the number of jobs i received between ρ and τ (including ρ
but excluding τ ) in ARLMS(bi) by β and in ARLMS(b′i) by β∗.
Observation 6.16. β∗ ≤ β + 1.
Proof. Machine i received at least as many jobs in ARLMS(bi) as in ARLMS(b′i) after ρ. This must be
true because ρ was the last time machine i stole a job. However, machine i received the job at time ρ in
ARLMS(b′i) but not in ARLMS(bi), and so we cannot claim that β∗ ≤ β, but only that β∗ ≤ β + 1.
Proof of Proposition 6.13 continued. From the definition of lp and equation (9), we get:
lpτi (b
′
i) =
⌊
hτi (b
′
i) + 1
b′i
⌋
=
⌊
hρi (b
′
i) + β
∗ + 1
b′i
⌋
(10)
≤
⌊
hρi (b
′
i) + β + 2
b′i
⌋
(11)
≤
⌊
hρi (bi) + β + 1
bi
⌋
(12)
= lpτi (bi). (13)
Equality (10) stems from the definition of β∗, Inequality (11) is due to Observation 6.16, Inequality (12)
is due to Equation (9), and Equality (12) is from the definition of β.
This is in contradiction to Equation (8), and therefore Dτ (k) ≤ 0. This concludes the proof of the
proposition.
Lemma 6.17. The allocation algorithm ARLMS provides an O(log log n)-approximation to the optimal
allocation.
The proof is similar to the proof for the unmodified Greedy algorithm in the case of non-uniform
bins of [BBFN14]. We provide it in Appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 6.18. There exists a local payment scheme PRLMS such that the mechanism M2 = (A2,P2)
is universally truthful.
Proof. Having shown that ARLMS is universally monotone, we can use the payment scheme of [AT01]:
pi(bi, b−i) = bihi(bi, b−i) +
bi∑
x=0
hi(x, b−i) (14)
Unfortunately, the height of machine i is not an easily computable function of i’s bid. We therefore
need to explicitly compute the value of hi(x, b−i) for every x ∈ [0, bi]. That is, we need to run the
allocation algorithm ARLMS again with each possible bid x ∈ [0, bi]. As the running time of ARLMS
is O(log n), and bi = O(log n), this will take at most O(log2 n). Note that as the time to compute the
permutation is O(log3 n), computing the payment this way will not affect the asymptotic running time
of the mechanism.
We conclude:
Theorem 6.19. There exists an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n)- local mechanism to scheduling on related
machines in the restricted setting that is universally truthful and gives an O(log log n)-approximation
to the makespan.
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7 Local auctions for unit demand buyers
We propose local truthful mechanisms for auctions with unit-demand buyers, in which each buyer is
interested in at most k items, and each item is desired by at most a polylogarithmic number of buyers.
First, we tackle the case where all buyers have the same valuation for the items in their sets, and the
buyers’ private information is their sets. Then we examine the case in which the buyers’ sets are public
knowledge and the buyers’ private information is their valuations for their items, with the restriction that
buyers have the same valuation for all items in their set.
Related work Combinatorial auctions are an extremely well-studied problem in algorithmic game
theory. The general premise is the following: we wish to allocate m goods to n players, who have
valuations for subsets of goods, with the goal of maximizing the social welfare. The general problem,
where each player may have an an arbitrary valuation for each subset of the goods is known to be NP -
hard; indeed, even approximating the optimal solution for single-minded bidders to within
√
m(1− ǫ) is
NP -hard [LOS02]. Therefore, in order to obtain useful approximation algorithms, we must relax some
of our demands. One such relaxation is limiting ourselves to identical items. An example is the case of
k-minded bidders: There are m identical indivisible goods, and n buyers with k valuations each - each
buyer i has a valuation vi(j) for obtaining j items (where j is between 1 and k). [DN10] gave a PTAS
for this problem, and showed that (under certain restrictions), obtaining an FPTAS is NP -hard. [KV12]
gave universally truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in an on-line model.
We use the following theorem from [MRVX12] for finding maximal matchings in undirected graphs.
Theorem 7.1. [MRVX12] Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with n vertices and maximum degree
d. Then there is an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n) - local computation algorithm for maximal matching.
As in the case of load balancing, the idea behind Theorem 7.1 is that one can simulate the well-
known Greedy on-line algorithm for maximal matching, using a random permutation of the edges.
7.1 Unit-demand buyers with uniform value
We first consider the following scenario. We have a set I of n unit-demand buyers, and a set J of m
indivisible items. There is a fixed, identical value for all items, which we normalize to 1. Each buyer i
is interested in a set Ji of at most k items (where k is a constant). We can treat this auction as a graph
G = (V,E), in which V = J ∪ I , and E = {(i, j) : i ∈ I, j ∈ Ji}. The value of a subset S to
buyer i is vi(S) = 1 if S ∩ Ji 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise. Namely, the buyers are indifferent between the
items in their set (they all have the same valuation for the items in their set, and a zero valuation for
all other items). The utility of buyer i is quasi-linear, that is, when she receives items S and pays p her
utility is ui(S, p) = vi(S)− p. We assume that the subsets Ji are selected uniformly at random and that
kn/m = O(1).10
Our goal is to design a local mechanism that maximizes the social welfare. In order to do this, we
would like to satisfy as many buyers as possible, allocating each buyer a single item from her set. We
call this type of auction an k−UDUV (unit demand, uniform value) auction.
Ideally, we would like to find a maximum matching between the buyers and items, as this will
maximize the social welfare. However, it is not possible to solve the maximum matching problem
locally, as the following theorem shows. This is one important challenge that the local setting adds to
the algorithmic mechanism design.
Theorem 7.2. There does not exist an LCA for the maximum matching problem.
10We require this for ease of analysis. However, it suffices that the sets are distributed in such a way as to resemble a uniform
or binomial distribution [MRVX12].
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Proof. To see why it is not always possible to solve the maximum matching locally, consider the fol-
lowing family of homomorphic graphs: G = {Gi}. All Gi ∈ G have 2n vertices: {v1, v2, . . . , v2n}. In
each Gi, vertices v−i comprise an (odd) cycle, and vertex vi is connected to vertex vi−1 (modulo 2n).
Each Gi has a unique maximum matching. We are given as input a graph G ∈ G, (i.e., we know it is Gi
for some i, but we don’t know the value of i). We would like to know whether the edge e = (v1, v2) is
in the maximum matching. Note that the edge e will be in exactly half of the maximum matchings.
Assume that the graph is either Gn or Gn+1. In the distributed model, this implies that the distance
between the edge e = (v1, v2) and the distinguishing place of Gn and Gn+1 is n edges, which will be a
lower bound on the time to detect the correct graph.
In the local computation model, we can write the edges in a random order. This implies that one
needs to query, on average, n edges to distinguish between Gn and Gn+1.
Therefore there cannot exist an LCA for maximum matching.
Corollary 7.3. There does not exist an LCA for the maximum matching problem in bipartite graphs.
Proof. The proof is similar to the general case. In the bipartite case, though, in each Gi, the vertices
v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+2, . . . , v2n comprise an even cycle. Vertex vi is connected to vertex vi−1 and vertex
vi+1 is connected to vertex vi+2 (modulo 2n). Note that the edges (vi−1, vi) and (vi+1, vi+2) must be in
the maximum matching, because the maximum matching in this case is of size n, meaning all vertices
must be matched, including vi and vi+1.
Since there is no local algorithm for computing the maximum matching11, we will content ourselves
with finding an approximation to the maximum matching.
7.1.1 A 12 -approximation to the maximum matching
To obtain a 12 -approximation, we use the local greedy matching algorithm of [MRVX12], which we
denote by AUDUV . Algorithm AUDUV simulates the well-known greedy on-line algorithm - as an edge
arrives, it is added to the matching, if possible.
Our mechanism MUDUV = (AUDUV ,PUDUV ) works as follows. The mechanism receives from
each buyer i a subset J ′i ⊂ J . For the allocation algorithm AUDUV , the mechanism decides on a random
order in which it considers the items. Specifically, the mechanism assigns each item j a real number
rj ∼u [0, 1], sampled independently and uniformly. The order of the items is determined by rj (higher
rj items are considered first). Notice that because the rj are allocated independently, buyers cannot
influence the order in which the items as considered. Given this order induced by rj , the mechanism
considers items one at a time. When item j is considered, if there is some buyer i such that j ∈ J ′i and
buyer i was not allocated any item yet, then j is allocated to buyer i. If there is more than one such
buyer, ties are broken lexicographically.
As the values of all items are identical, any payment scheme PUDUV that fulfills voluntary partici-
pation is adequate, i.e., the payment can be any value in the range [0, 1]. For example, charge p = 1/2
from any buyer that receives an item and p = 0 from any buyer that does not receive an item.
In order to show that our mechanism is truthful, we need only to show that buyers cannot profit by
bidding J ′i 6= Ji.
Theorem 7.4. In the k-UDUV auction, the mechanism MUDUV = (AUDUV ,PUDUV ) is universally
truthful and provides a 12 -approximation to the optimal allocation.
Proof. The proof will be done in two steps. First, we show that for any J ′i , bidding Ji ∩ J ′i weakly
dominates bidding J ′i . Second, we show that bidding Ji weakly dominates bidding any J∗i ⊆ Ji.
11Actually, we only require a maximum matching in the special case of bipartite graphs. Corollary 7.3 shows that this is not
possible either.
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To show that Ji ∩ J ′i weakly dominates bidding J ′i , label the items in Ji ∩ J ′i as good, and those in
J ′i \ Ji by bad. If a good item is allocated to buyer i when she bids J ′i , it will also be allocated to her
when bidding Ji ∩ J ′i . Therefore the value of buyer i cannot decrease by bidding Ji ∩ J ′i , and hence
Ji ∩ J ′i weakly dominates bidding J ′i .
To show that bidding Ji weakly dominates bidding any J∗i ⊆ Ji, consider the following. If buyer
i does not receive any items when bidding J∗i , the claim trivially holds. Assume buyer i receives item
j when bidding J∗i . Then, when bidding Ji, if she has not received any item from Ji \ J∗i before
considering item j, then she will receive item j. Therefore, if she receives an item when bidding J∗i ,
she will also receive an item when bidding Ji, and have the same valuation and utility. This proves that
bidding Ji weakly dominates bidding J∗i ⊆ Ji.
The reasoning that the allocation is a 12 -approximation is similar to the proof of maximal versus
maximum matching. Consider a buyer which is not allocated an item in AUDUV and is allocated an
item in the optimal allocation. Her item is allocated to a unique different buyer in AUDUV . This bounds
the number of buyers allocated items in the optimal allocation and not in AUDUV by the number of
buyers that are allocated items in AUDUV , giving the factor of 12 approximation, and completing the
proof of the theorem.
The fact that AUDUV is a (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n) - LCA for maximal matching on graph of
bounded degree k was shown in [MRVX12]. The result also implicitly holds for bipartite graphs in
which the degrees are bounded on one side and distributed binomially on the other. This is exactly
the case when buyers are interested in k items each and the buyers’ choices can be seen as sampled
uniformly from the items. Therefore, we derive the following theorem:
Theorem 7.5. The k-UDUV auction has an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n) - local computation mecha-
nism which is universally truthful and provides a 12 -approximation to the optimal social welfare.
7.2 Unit demand buyers, uniform-buyer-value
We have a set I of n buyers, and a set J of m items. Each buyer i is interested in a set of at most k
items, Ji ⊆ J , which is public knowledge, and has a private valuation, ti (which represents the value
of any item from Ji to buyer i). Buyer i’s valuation for subset S is vi(S) = ti if S ∩ Ji 6= ∅, and 0
otherwise. The utility of buyer i is quasi-linear, namely her utility of receiving subset S and paying p is
ui(S, p) = vi(S)− p.
We can treat this auction as a weighted graph G = (V,E), in which V = J ∪ I , and E = ∪iEi
where Ei = {(i, j) : j ∈ Ji}. Every edge e ∈ Ei has weight w(e) = ti.
We assume that Ji has a uniform or binomial distribution and that kn/m = O(1).12 In addition, we
make the simplifying assumption that the buyers are Bayesian - the valuations ti are randomly drawn
from some prior (not necessarily known) distribution, that is identical to all buyers. We call this type of
auction an k−UDUBV (unit demand, uniform buyer value) auction.
We require that if buyer i does not receive an item, she pays nothing. If buyer i receives an item, the
mechanism charges her pi(b), where b is the bid vector. (Any buyer will receive at most one item in the
allocation of the mechanism). We would like to ensure that bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for
all buyers. Hence, we need to show that, for all bi and b−i, we have ui(ti, b−i) ≥ ui(bi, b−i).
The allocation algorithm, AUDUBV , is as follows. First, AUDUBV orders the buyers by their bids.
Starting with the buyer with the highest bid, each buyer i is allocated an item ji ∈ Ji such that ji has not
yet been allocated. If more than one such item exists, we allocate the (lexicographically) first ji ∈ Ji.
(We assume the items have lexicographic order.) If there is no such item, then buyer i is not allocated
any item. We continue until we cannot allocate any more items.
12As in the previous section, we require this for ease of analysis. However, it suffices that the sets are distributed in such a
way as to resemble a uniform or binomial distribution [MRVX12].
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First, we claim that the resulting allocation is a 12 -approximation.
Claim 7.6. The allocation algorithm AUDUBV provides a 12 -approximation to the optimal allocation,
with respect to the bids b.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof that any maximal matching is a 2-approximation to a maximum
matching. Regard the auction as a bipartite graph G = (U,W,E), with U representing the buyers and
W representing the items. There is a weighted edge between each buyer i and every item ji ∈ Ji. The
weight of each edge e = (i, ji) is the bid of buyer i, bi. The optimal allocation is a maximum weighted
matching, while AUDUBV considers the buyers in the order of their bi’s and finds a maximal matching.
If an edge e = (i, ji) is added in AUDUBV but not in the optimal matching, then it is allocated
instead of at most 2 edges in the optimal matching (an edge e′ containing i and an edge e′′ containing
ji). Because AUDUBV considers edges according to their weights, we know that w(e) ≥ w(e′) and
w(e) ≥ w(e′′). Therefore 2w(e) ≥ w(e′) + w(e′′) and so the ratio between AUDUBV and the optimal
allocation is at least 12 .
We now need to specify the payment mechanism. To calculate buyer i’s payment when she receives
an item, we run AUDUBV without buyer i. Buyer i pays the smallest value for which any of her items is
sold when the auction is run without her. (This is exactly the minimal value of bi which would still gain
her an item). We label buyer i’s payment by pi, hence, the payments are PUDUBV = {p1, . . . pn}.
Claim 7.7. In mechanism MUDUBV = (AUDUBV ,PUDUBV ), for all buyers i and all bi, bidding ti
weakly dominates bidding bi.
Proof. We will show that, fixing the bids of all other buyers at b−i,
1. Buyer i has no incentive to over-bid, i.e., bid bi > ti .
2. Buyer i has no incentive to under-bid i.e., bid bi < ti .
To prove (1), we notice that if buyer i receives an item, then she has no incentive to bid higher, as
she has no preference between items. Furthermore, bidding higher cannot change her payment, as her
payment is independent of her bid. If she does not receive an item, then pi ≥ bi(= ti)13, and so if she
bids more, she might receive an item, but will have to pay at least ti if she does, which will result in a
non-positive utility.
To prove (2), we notice that if buyer i does not receive an item, she cannot obtain an item by bidding
lower, because the algorithm allocates first to higher bids. If she is allocated an item, then bidding lower
will not make a difference, unless she bids under pi, in which case she will not receive any item, and
hence have zero utility.
Claims 7.6 and 7.7 imply the following.
Theorem 7.8. The mechanism MUDUBV is universally truthful and provides a 12 -approximation to the
optimal social welfare.
Algorithm AUDUBV is a (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n) - LCA for maximal matching on graph of
bounded degree k, by [MRVX12]. Notice, however, that we need to run AUDUBV once for calculating
the allocation, and k more times for calculating the payment. Hence, we have the following.
Theorem 7.5. (2) There is an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n) - local mechanism for k−UDUBV auction
which is universally truthful and provides a 12 -approximation to the optimal social welfare.
13As specified, if buyer i does not receive an item, she pays 0. However, if the mechanism were to compute the payment,
i.e., run the mechanism without her, the payment would be pi ≥ bi(= ti).
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8 Single minded bidders
We extend the results of Section 7.2 to the case of combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders:
There is a set I of n buyers, and a set J of m items. Each buyer i is interested in a set of at most k
items, Ji ⊆ J , which is public knowledge, and has a private valuation, ti, which represents the value
of the entire subset Ji to buyer i. Buyer i’s valuation for subset S is vi(S) = ti if Ji ⊆ S, and 0
otherwise. The utility of buyer i is quasi-linear, namely her utility of receiving subset S and paying p is
ui(S, p) = vi(S)− p.
As in Subsection 7.2, we assume that Ji has a uniform or binomial distribution, and that the valua-
tions ti are randomly drawn from some prior (not necessarily known) distribution,and kn/m = O(1).
The allocation algorithm, AkSMB, is as follows. First, AkSMB orders the buyers by their bids.
Starting with the buyer with the highest bid, each buyer i is allocated subset Ji such that no item ji ∈ Ji
has been allocated yet. We continue until we cannot allocate any more subsets.
Claim 8.1. The allocation algorithm AkSMB provides a 1k -approximation to the optimal allocation,
with respect to the values b.
Proof. Compare the allocation of Algorithm AkSMB, J∗, to the optimal allocation, OPT . Each set
J ∈ J∗ is chosen by AkSMB instead of at most k sets in OPT , but its weight is greater than each of
their weights, because AkSMB is a greedy algorithm.
The payment scheme is as follows. To calculate buyer i’s payment when she receives an item, we run
AkSMB without buyer i. Buyer i pays the highest value of the allocated sets Jx for which Ji ∩ Jx 6= ∅.
(This is exactly the minimal value of bi which would still gain her an item). We label buyer i’s payment
by pi, and let PkSMB = {p1, . . . pn}.
Claim 8.2. In mechanism MkSMB = (AkSMB,PkSMB), for all buyers i and all bi, bidding ti weakly
dominates bidding bi.
The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 7.7 and is omitted.
Combining Claims 8.1 and 8.2, we get
Theorem 8.3. There is an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n) - local mechanism for combinatorial auctions
with known k−single minded bidders (where the sets are sampled uniformly at random), which is uni-
versally truthful and provides a 1k -approximation to the optimal social welfare.
9 Random serial dictatorship
We would like to allocate n houses to n agents. We assume that each agent is interested in a constant
number of houses, d, and that the preferences are drawn from the uniform distribution. Each agent i
has a complete preference relation Ri over the d houses. In the random serial dictatorship algorithm,
a permutation over the agents is generated, and then each agent chooses her most preferred house out
of the unallocated houses. We would like to simulate this algorithm locally: Each agent i is allocated,
uniformly and at random, an integer ri ∈ [n4]. r determines the permutation: if ri < rj then agent
i makes a choice before agent j. If ri = rj , the tie is broken lexicographically. Agent i checks, for
each of its d housing choices in the order induced by Ri, whether it has been allocated already. If
it has not, i chooses the house. For i to check whether or not house j has already been allocated, it
needs to check whether any of the agents interested in j had already chosen it. i therefore needs to
recursively check the allocation of all agents that arrived before her, on which her allocation depends.
As in [ARVX12, MRVX12], we model this using a query tree. We recall the following lemma from
[MRVX12]:
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Lemma 9.1 ([MRVX12]). Let G = ({V,U}, E) be a bipartite graph, |V | = n and |U | = m and
n = cm for some constant c ≥ 1, such that for each vertex v ∈ V there are d edges chosen independently
and at random between v and U . For any constant α there is a constant C which depends only on d and
α such that
Pr[|T | < C log n] > 1− 1/nα,
where the probability is taken over all of the possible permutations π ∈ Π of the vertices of G, and T is
a random query tree in G under π.
This implies that in order to reply to any query, we will require more that O(log n) queries to the
graph with probability at most 1/n2, which implies the following theorem:
Theorem 9.2. Let k be some constant integer k > 0. Consider a house allocation problem with n agents
and n houses, and let each agent preference list length be bounded by k, where each list is drawn uni-
formly at random from the set of all possible lists of length k. Then there is an (O(log4 n), O(log3 n), 1/n)
- LCA which simulates, and whose output is identical to, the Random Serial Dictatorship allocation al-
gorithm.
10 Open questions
We provide several interesting open questions.
Open question 1 How restrictive is the local computation setting? It remains an interesting open
question in general, and specifically for the load balancing problem, while the intractability of the non-
local problem carries over to the local computation setting, there exists a truthful PTAS for the non-local
setting. How well can we approximate the optimal solution using LCAs? Furthermore, it would be
interesting to quantify the added difficulty imposed by the requirement of truthfulness.
Open question 2 An intriguing open problem is whether there exists a truthful local mechanism in the
unit-demand combinatorial auction setting, where both the sets and the valuations are private informa-
tion. We conjecture that this is impossible, especially considering a similar result of [FLSS11], albeit in
a different setting (auctions with budgets).
Open question 3 In this paper, we show an LCA which provides a 1/2-approximation to the optimal
solution for unit-demand buyers, using a maximal matching LCA. [MV13], showed that there exists a
(1 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm to maximum matching. Unfortunately, that algorithm does not yield
a monotonic allocation. Is there an LCA which provides a better than 1/2-approximation that can be
transformed to a local computation mechanism?
Open question 4 If we view the k-single minded bidder combinatorial auction as a hypergraph H =
(V,E), where each item is represented by a vertex v ∈ V , and each player by a weighted hyper-
edge e ∈ E, the problem is reduced to maximal weighted independent set in k-regular hypergraphs,
(equivalently weighted k-set packing). [CH01] show how to approximate weighted k-set packing to
within 2(k+1)/3, via local improvements. It would be interesting to see if it would be possible to apply
of their techniques to obtain a local mechanism with a better approximation ratio.
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Open question 5 In this paper, we often need to make the assumption that the demands of the bidders
are drawn from some distribution in order to ensure the locality of our mechanisms. This is quite a
strong assumption, and it would be interesting to see how far it can be relaxed.
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A Proof of Lemma 6.17
Lemma 6.17. The allocation algorithm ARLMS provides an O(log log n)-approximation to the optimal
allocation.
We prove the theorem for the case d = 2 (each job can be assigned to one of 2 machines). The proof
is easily expandable for the case of d > 2. For the proof (not the algorithm), we regard each machine i
of capacity ci as having ci slots of capacity 1. Before presenting the proof we need several definitions:
The load vector of an allocation of jobs into n machines is L = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓn), where ℓi = hi is
the load of machine i. The normalized load vector L¯ consists of the members of L in non-increasing
order (where the order among machines with the same load is arbitrary). For the case of non-uniform
machines of capacities c1, . . . cn, and total capacity C =
∑n
i=1 ci, we define the slot-load vector S =
(h1,1, . . . h1,c1 , h2,1, . . . h2,c2 , . . . hn,1, . . . hn,cn), where if machine i contains r jobs, the first r mod c
slots will have ⌈r/c⌉ jobs, and the remaining slots will have ⌊r/c⌋ jobs. If a machine has an uneven
allocation of jobs, we call the slots with more jobs heavy, and the slots with less jobs light. If the load
on a machine is an integer (all of the slots of the machine have an identical number of jobs assigned to
them), we call all the slots light. When we add a job to a machine, we add the job to one of the light
slots, arbitrarily. The normalized slot load vector S¯ is S sorted in non-increasing order (slots of the same
machine may be separated in S¯). We add a subscript t to these vectors, i.e., Lt, L¯t, St and S¯t to indicate
the vector after the allocation of the t-th job.
Definition A.1 (Majorization, ). We say that a vector P = (p1, . . . , pn) majorizes vector Q =
(q1, . . . , qm) (denoted PQ) if and only if for all 1 ≤ k ≤ min(m,n),
k∑
i=1
p¯i ≥
k∑
i=1
q¯i,
where p¯i and q¯i are the i-th entries of the normalized vectors P¯ and Q¯.
For n ∈ N, let [n] denote {1, . . . , n}.
Definition A.2 (System Majorization). Let A and B be two processes allocating m jobs into machines
with the same total capacity n. Let τ = (τ1 . . . τ2m), τi ∈ [n] be a vector representing the (slot) choices
of the m jobs (τ2i−1 and τ2i are the choices of the i-th job). Let SA(τ) and SB(τ) be the slot load
vectors using A and B respectively with the random choices specified by τ . Then we say
1. A majorizes B (denoted by the overloaded notation AB) if there is a bijection f : [n]2m →
[n]2m such that for all possible random choices τ ∈ [n]2m,we have
LA(τ)LB(f(τ))
2. The maximum load of A majorizes the maximum load of B (denoted by AmB) if there is a
bijection f : [n]2m → [n]2m such that for all possible random choices τ ∈ [n]2m,we have
ℓA1 (τ) ≥ ℓB1 (f(τ)),
where ℓA1 (τ) and ℓB1 (f(τ)) are the loads of the most loaded bins in A and B respectively with the
random choices specified by τ and f(τ) respectively.
Observation A.3. AB ⇒ AmB.
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We now turn to the proof of Lemma 6.17.
First, notice that if we have an system of m identical machines, each of capacity 1, both the unmod-
ified Greedy algorithm and the allocation algorithm ARLMS will behave in exactly the same way - the
load and the ⌊load⌋ are the same if the capacity is 1. From [ABKU99], we know that the maximal load
on any machine when allocating m = n jobs (to n machines with capacity 1) with the Greedy algo-
rithm, is Θ(log log n). Therefore, the maximal load when allocating m = m jobs with ARLMS is also
Θ(log log n) in this setting. We would like to show that the maximal load of a system with non-uniform
machines of total capacity C is majorized by the maximal load of a system with C machines of capacity
1, when the allocating algorithm is ARLMS . We will show that the first system majorizes the second,
and deduce the required result from Observation A.3.
We restate Claim 2.4 of [Wie07]:
Claim A.4 ([Wie07]). Let P and Q be two normalized integer vectors such that PQ. If i ≤ j then
P + eiQ+ ej where ei is the i-th unit vector and P + ei and Q+ ej are normalized.
Lemma A.5. For allocation algorithm ARLMS , let A be a system with non-uniform machines of total
capacity C , and B be a system with C uniform machines of capacity 1 each. Then BA.
Proof. We use the slot load vectors of systems A and B (in B the load vector and slot load vector
are identical), and show that SB(f(τ))SA(τ). The bijection is such that the jobs in both processes
choose the same k1 < k2 ∈ {1, . . . , C} in the normalized slot load vectors, and the choice corresponds
to machines k1, k2 in B and the machines associated with those specific slots in system A. We use
induction: for t = 0, the claim is trivially true.
From the inductive hypothesis, before the allocation of the t-th job, SBt−1(f(τ))SAt−1(τ). In system
B, the t-th job goes to machine k2. In system A, if the ⌊load⌋ of the machine of k1 is greater than that
of the machine of k2, the job goes to k2 if k2 is a light slot, or to a slot to the right of k2 (a lighter slot
of the same machine), if k2 is a heavy slot. If the ⌊loads⌋ of the machines of k1 and k2 are the same,
again, the job goes to k2 if k2 is a light slot, or to a slot to the right of k2 (again, a lighter slot of the same
machine), if k2 is a heavy slot. In all cases, by Claim A.4, it follows that SB(f(τ))SA(τ).
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